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ABSTRACT
In eBay v. MercExchange, the Supreme Court held the Federal Circuit could no longer utilize
their long-standing "general rule" that an injunction should follow the finding of patent
infringement. The Supreme Court held that courts should utilize a set of rules known as the
four-factor test, which utilizes traditional principals of equity. Concurrently, Congress has
been debating patent reform with one of the topics being the use of injunctive relief as a
remedy for patent infringement. These two changes could potentially have a significant effect
on the technological and economic landscape of patents in the future. It now may be more
difficult for these patent holders to get injunctive relief or more importantly, to threaten an
injunction against alleged patent infringers. The goal of this proposal is to protect the
legitimate inventors and patent holders, large or small, from big companies' abuse of patented
technology while also protecting those same big companies against the Patent Trolls. The twofold proposal presented meets both needs while furthering innovation, and thus, it also serves
the fundamental goals of the patent system.
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INTRODUCTION

"[A] valid patent system is vital to the continued health of innovation, and,
hence, economic growth and prosperity."1 One of the current subjects intensely
debated in connection with Patent Act reform is the availability of permanent
injunctions 2 to patent holders. 3 Some patent holders, known as "Patent Trolls,"
threaten to sue larger technology companies for patent infringement with the threat
of a permanent injunction. 4 Patent Trolls are typically defined as a patent holding
company or individual that has acquired a patent with little participation in the
marketplace of that patent. 5 The threat of a permanent injunction against powerful
technology companies by Patent Trolls forces those companies into costly settlement
agreements because they are wary of imminent litigation and the threat of shutting
down their product lines. 6 Large technology firms argue patent reform is necessary
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lADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS-HOW OUR BROKEN
PATENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 207
(Princeton University Press 2004).
2 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 800 (8th ed. 2004). "An injunction [court order commanding or
preventing an action] granted after a final hearing on the merits." Td. Soo also JANICE M.
MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 383 (2d ed. Aspen Publishers 2006) ("A permanent
injunction is one that is issued after a final judgment of infringement and no invalidity or
unenforceability. This is a standard part of the final judgment in a patent case that permanently
enjoins the infringing party from any further infringement during the remaining term of the
patent.").
MUELLER, supra note 2, at 384 (discussing the possible effects of patent reform on the use of
injunctive relief in a patent infringement case).
4 Id.
5 Id.; see also Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Comment, Patent Investment Trusts: Let' Build a PIT to
Catch the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 367, 367 (2005) (defining a Patent Troll as "somebody
who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they are not practicing and have no intention of
practicing and ... [have] never practiced.") (quoting Peter Detkin, the former assistant general
counsel for Intel Corp.); Patent Trolls: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and
Intelleetual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109t h Cong. (2006) (statement of Lamar
Smith, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary) (defining a Patent Troll as an individual or company who "invents a patented product
or process of suspect legal integrity or who acquires such a patent from a third party" and then
"makes money by extorting a license from a manufacturer who allegedly has infringed the patent").
6 MUELLER, supra note 2, at 384.
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to deny the availability of permanent injunctions as a remedy to Patent Trolls.7
Conversely, small technology firms and inventors argue the courts should continue to
8
grant permanent injunctions to protect patent property rights.
Part I of this comment discusses the statutory background and case history of
injunctive relief in patent infringement cases, the patent reform recommendations
with regards to injunctive relief, and a case analysis of a recent Supreme Court case
regarding the use of injunctive relief in a patent infringement case. Part II provides
an analysis of injunctive relief by discussing the Supreme Court's decision in the
eBay case as well as proposed patent reform recommendations, including the positive
and negative effects for technological advances and economic prosperity. Finally,
Part III proposes a recommendation for injunctive relief in patent infringement cases
for both the courts and Congress as a positive measure for both technological and
economic prosperity.

I. BACKGROUND
In 1952, Congress codified Title 35, known as The Patent Act. 9 Section 283 of
The Patent Act states the following regarding injunctions: "[tihe several courts
having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with
the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on
such terms as the court deems reasonable." 1° Injunctive relief has long been an
important remedy for the patent holder because an injunction excludes others from
using the patent holder's ideas.1 1

7

Soo Brief of Time Warner, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at **8-9, eBay

Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
167.
8 Brief of the United Inventors Ass'n and Technology Licensing Corp. as Amici Curiae in
Support Of MercExchange, L.L.C. on the Merits at **4-5, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130), 2006
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 333.
9 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
1035 U.S.C. § 283.
11Smith Intern., Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Federal
Circuit further discussed the right to exclude. Id. When it stated:
Without this injunctive power of the courts, the right to exclude granted by
the patent would be diminished, and the express purpose of the Constitution and
Congress, to promote the progress of the useful arts, would be seriously
undermined. The patent owner would lack much of the "leverage," afforded by the
right to exclude, to enjoy the full value of his invention in the market place.
Without the right to obtain an injunction, the right to exclude granted to the
patentee would have only a fraction of the value it was intended to have, and
would no longer be as great an incentive to engage in the toils of scientific and
technological research.
Id. at 1577-78.
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A. HistoricalUse ofInjunctive Relief as a Remedy
Throughout history, courts have commonly used injunctive relief as a remedy for
patent infringement cases. 12 For example, in W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v.
Garlock, Inc. 13 the district court stated previous courts have found an injunction
14
should follow a finding of patent infringement absent any exigent circumstances.
W.L. Gore indicated courts should issue an injunction following the establishment of
infringement unless a sufficient reason exists for denying it. 15 The Federal Circuit
had labeled this rule the "general rule" for injunctions in patent infringement
cases.16 The district court in W.L. Gore found infringement, but they declined to
follow the "general rule" in granting an injunction because the patent infringer no
longer made or sold either of the infringing products. 1' Following the appeal, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the finding of infringement, but overturned the denial of an
injunction.1 8 The Federal Circuit stated "It]he fact that the defendant has stopped
infringing is generally not a reason for denying an injunction against future
infringement unless the evidence is very persuasive that further infringement will
not take place." 19
However, in August 2006, in eBay Inc. v. MereExchange, L.L. C., the Supreme
20
Court held that courts should no longer use the Federal Circuit's "general rule".
The Supreme Court held that courts should utilize a set of equity rules for injunctive
relief as the remedy for a patent infringement case. 21 This set of rules, known as the
four-factor test, has arisen from "established principals of equity."2 2 The Supreme
Court has historically held in any injunction case that a plaintiff seeking a
§ 20.04 (1)(a)(i) (2006).
842 F.2d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
14 Id. at 1281. The W.L. Gore court stated, "[a]lthough the district court's grant or denial of an
injunction is discretionary depending on the facts of the case, injunctive relief against an adjudged
infringer is usually granted." Id. (citations omitted). See also Windsurfing Intern. Inc. v. AMF, Inc.,
782 F.2d 995, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (opinion written by Chief Judge Markey stating injunctive relief
against an adjudged infringer is usually granted). KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d
1522, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating while injunctive relief is discretionary by the district court, the
granting of an injunction is the "norm" when there is infringement).
15 Gore, 842 F.2d at 1281; see also Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d
1552, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding an injunction can also include barring the "use" of an
infringed product if that will "prevent the violation of any right secured by patent").
16Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989). (stating "i]t is the
general rule that an injunction will issue when infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound
reason for denying it.").
17Gore, 842 F.2d at 1278.
18 Id. at 1283.
19 Id. at 1281-82; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. New England Elec. Mfg. Co., 128 F. 738, 740 (2d
Cir. 1904) (stating "[t]he argument in such circumstances is very simple. If the defendant be honest
in his protestations an injunction will do him no harm; if he be dishonest the court should place a
strong hand upon him....").
20 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006) (stating "We hold only that
the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the
district courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of
equity, in patent disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards.").
21 Id. at 1839.
22 Id.
In this case, the Supreme Court held a categorical denial or grant of injunctive relief was
error in patent cases like any other case without resort to any categorical rules. Id.
12 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS

13
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permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such
relief. 23 The plaintiff has the burden of proof to demonstrate (1) it has suffered an
irreparable injury, (2) any available remedy at law is inadequate to compensate for
that injury, such as monetary damages, (3) a remedy in equity is warranted
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, and (4) the
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. 24

B. Patent Trolls Had SubstantialBargainingPowerAgainst Large
Technology Firms Under the FederalCircuits "GeneralRule"
Prior to eBay, most courts followed the Federal Circuit's decision in W.L. Gore
with respect to a "general rule" for injunctive relief in patent infringement
disputes. 2 5 Because of the Federal Circuit's strong tendency to issue injunctive relief
to patent holders in infringement cases, Patent Trolls had tremendous bargaining
26
power under the Federal Circuit's "general rule."
Historically, few courts have used the term Patent Troll.2 7 However, a district
court in Utah recently discussed the Patent Troll controversy in Overstock.com, Inc.
v. Furnace Brook, L.L.C 2 8 In this case, the district court determined that Furnace
Brook clearly resembled a Patent Troll according to the court's definition.29
Overstock.com sought a declaratory judgment against Furnace Brook to show
30
either Furnace Brook's patent was invalid, or that Overstock.com did not infringe.
Furnace Brook had attempted to coerce several large companies into either paying
3 1
for a license or facing an infringement lawsuit, with the threat of an injunction.
Overstock.com decided not to pay for a license and therefore, Furnace Brook brought
suit against them.32 Ultimately, the district court dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. 33 The court held that Furnace Brook was not subject to federal
jurisdiction by merely sending cease-and-desist letters to a company in Utah, and
34
therefore, the court made no ruling on the infringement aspect of the case.

23 See

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982).

24 Id.; see also eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839 (concurring with the long-held four-factors for

injunctive relief in a patent infringement case as defined in Weinberger v. Romero-Barelo).
25 See Windsurfing Intern. Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
See also
Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found., 826 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D. Del. 1993). ("Entry of a permanent
injunction following a finding of infringement is usually granted. An injunction should issue once
infringement has been established unless there is a sufficient reason for denying it.") (citations
omitted).
26 See MUELLER, supra note 2, at 384.
27 Overstock.com, Inc. v. Furnace Brook, L.L.C., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1222 (D. Utah 2005).
"Indeed, while 'patent troll' appears to be a term commonly used in the popular literature, the
phrase has yet to appear in a Federal Circuit case." Id.
28 Id. at 1218.
29 Id.
30 Id.
Furnace Brook acquired a patent for software and computer systems that facilitates
Internet selling. Id.

Id.
Id. at 1218-19.
33 Id. at 1218.
34 Id. at 1221.
31

32
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However, in dicta, the court asserted that when a case involves a Patent Troll,
the court should provide a different remedy. 35 The court found that Furnace Brook
was more interested in negotiating licensing agreements with many firms rather
than enforcing its patent rights. 36 Therefore, in situations like this, the court should
provide a different remedy, such as money damages, and the court should not follow
37
the "general rule" of an automatic injunction.
Overstoek.om also discussed how Patent Trolls are able to prosper in the
environment the Federal Circuit had created. Federal Circuit holdings using the
"general rule" have given Patent Trolls the ability to threaten injunctions and
litigation against a potential infringer in a forum without personal jurisdiction, and
without fear of being subject to suit themselves in that forum.38 The Overstoek.om
court further stated this unintentional benefit might make it reasonable to hold
Patent Trolls subject to personal jurisdiction.3 9 "Such a change in precedent might
well help stem the tide of coercive patent litigation." 40 Overstoek.om concluded that
the Federal Circuit's "general rule" does not appear to consider Patent Trolls like
Furnace Brook whose only apparent asset is a patent which is used to send demand
41
letters to potential infringers in order to procure licensing fees.
The recent case of NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.4 2 also demonstrated the
bargaining power of Patent Trolls with the threat of injunction. Research in Motion
("RIM") is recognized for their wireless technology known as the BlackberryTM. 43 In
3 Id. at 1222-23. Furnace Brook's first two letters to Overstock.com did not directly accuse
Overstock.com of infringing its patent, however, they did make several lucrative offers to license it.
Id. at 1222. Furnace Brook's final letter to Overstock.com presented a virtually identical case to
that of Sharper Image Corporation filing against Furnace Brook in San Francisco. Id. The final
letter included Furnace Brook's strategy to seek dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, which is
the same strategy they attempted to use with Overstock.com. Id. These actions revealed that
Furnace Brook used a calculated business strategy to demand licenses from non-New York
corporations in reliance on the Federal Circuit's pronouncement that its cease-and-desist letters
alone will not subject it to suits in non-New York courts. Id. The court found that these actions are
all characteristic of a Patent Troll. Id.
M3Id. The court also stated that Furnace Brook focused its efforts on intimidating Overstock
with threats of injunction and litigation in order to coerce and persuade Overstock that it was in its
best interest to enter into a licensing agreement.

[d. Also, Furnace Brook made no efforts to

practice its patent or otherwise improve their own technology. Id.
37Id.at 1223.
38 Id.(stating '[p]rinciples of fair play and substantial justice' ... might suggest that it is fair
and reasonable to subject patent trolls to personal jurisdiction in the fora in which they attempt to
club alleged infringers into signing license agreements.") (citation omitted).
3 Id.
[T]here is undoubtedly some benefit in the currently risk-free proposition
Furnace Brook has undertaken of purchasing a patent at a bankruptcy auction
and sending demand letters throughout the country while hiding from preemptive
declaratory judgment actions behind the personal jurisdiction shield the Federal
Circuit has created. That benefit, it seems, would make jurisdiction reasonable in
this case.
Id. at 1222-23.
40 Id.at 1222.
41 Id. at 1223. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit later affirmed the judgment by the District
Court. Id. The court stated "[u]nder the existing law, the court has no choice but to dismiss." Id.
42 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
43_Td. at 1289-90. BlackBerryTM is a wireless handheld device that supports e-mail, cellular
telephone, text messaging, internet faxing, web browsing and other wireless information services.

[6:671 2007]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

2001, NTP sued RIM for infringing their wireless technology patents. 44 On every
issue during trial, the jury found in favor of NTP. 45 On August 5, 2003, the district
46
court entered final judgment in favor of NTP for over $53 million.
During the appeal and after a technical analysis of the claims,

47

the Federal

Circuit found RIM had committed patent infringement on at least some of NTP's
claims, which meant that an injunction may ensue for the BlackberryTM.48 Following
the finding of infringement on August 2, 2005, both parties continued to negotiate,
finally resulting in an enormous settlement between RIM and NTP in favor of NTP
49
in the amount of $612.5 million.
This result also illustrates the bargaining and economic power of a Patent
Troll.50 NTP had no desire to market, make, or sell their patented invention for
wireless email. 51 NTP's only desire was to sell the licensing rights to their patent
and hold others like RIM hostage for a large settlement agreement because of the
fear of an injunction.52
T
See id. The Blackberry M
also includes the standard Personal Digital Assistant ("PDA") functions of
calendar, contacts, to-do task lists, and notes. See id. The Blackberry'sTM popularity comes from its
ability to send and receive email wherever it can access a wireless network.
See id. The
Blackberry TM is especially popular for corporate wireless e-mail traffic, which accounts for 59% of
the wireless e-mail market. Ian Austen, Blackberry Adds Diversions, Counting on Sales, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2006, at C5.
44 NTP, 418 F.3d at 1290. The case proceeded to trial on fourteen claims. Id. The patents in
question were: 5,019,172, 5,436,960, 5,625,670, 6,067,451, 6,317,592. Id. at 1287.
45 Id.
A verdict was rendered on November 21, 2002. Id. The jury found direct, induced, and
contributory infringement by RIM on all asserted claims of the patents. Id. The jury also found that
the infringement was willful. Id. It rejected every defense proposed by RIM. Id. The jury awarded
damages to NTP in the amount of approximately $23 million, adopting a reasonable royalty rate of
5.7%. Id.
46 Id. The court awarded monetary damages totaling $53,704,322.69, with the following
approximate division: (1) compensatory damages of $33 million; (2) attorneys' fees of $4 million; (3)
prejudgment interest of $2 million; and (4) enhanced damages of $14 million. Id. The court also
entered a permanent injunction against RIM, enjoining it from further manufacture, use,
importation, and/or sale of all accused BlackBerryTM systems, software, and handhelds. Id. The
injunction was stayed pending the appeal. Id.
47 See id. at 1291-1311.
48 Id. at 1325-26. The court reversed the judgment of infringement on the method claims. Id.
The court affirmed the judgment of infringement to the system and apparatus claims not including
the "originating processor" limitation. Id. The court vacated the judgment of infringement to the
system claims containing the "originating processor" limitation. Id. Finally, the court remanded to
the lower court the questions as to whether and to what extent the verdict of infringement should be
vacated based on the prejudicial effect of the erroneous claim construction of the term "originating
processor." Id.
49 Susan Decker & Rebecca Barr, Settlement Reached, Blackberry Saved.* Maker ends Four
Yea-rPatentFight with $612.5Mi.Payment, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at 2.
50 Id. RIM took a strong stance against trolls in that they would not negotiate with trolls. Tim
Wu, Weapons of Business Destruction, SLATE, Feb. 6, 2006, http://www.slate.com/ id/2135559. After
RIM refused to pay NTP, NTP sued RIM in 2001. Id. "Given numerous chances to settle the case
for millions of dollars, [RIM] balked, cheated at trial, and managed to infuriate federal trial Judge
James Spencer." Id.
51 See id. Co-founder of New Technologies Products ("NTP"), David Stout, patented a series of
inventions based on wireless email in the early 1990s. Id. David Stout was a former patent
examiner and patent attorney and therefore had a solid knowledge of the patent system. Id.
52 Id.
NTP's patents for "wireless email" are arguably not even valid patents because the
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") should have considered the patents too obvious to merit a
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C. The Future ofInjunctive Relief as a Remedy for PatentInfringement
Many large technology companies have suggested the court's broad injunctive
discretion needs revising. One of the recently recommended patent reform bills may
make it more difficult for Patent Trolls to use injunctive relief as a remedy. 53 The
bills recommended two key additional phrases: "irreparable harm to the owner of the
55
patent," 54 and "the balance of hardships ... does not favor the owner of the patent."
These phrases are directly tied to traditional equitable principles, and they should
make it more difficult to grant injunctive relief to Patent Trolls. 56 However, it is
interesting to note that the current Patent Reform bills before the House and Senate
make no reference or recommended change to the existing language of section 283,
57
Injunctions.
In parallel with the patent reform bills, the Supreme Court unanimously decided
eBay, an important case for patent holders attempting to protect their patents rights,
and those seeking injunctive relief. 58 In eBay, the Supreme Court utilized the set of
equity rules for injunctive relief as the remedy for a patent infringement case. 59 The
Supreme Court held that courts should use the four-factor test in patent
60
infringement cases and not follow the Federal Circuit's "general rule".
During the trial court proceedings, the jury in eBay found the patent valid and
infringed and held damages were appropriate. 61 However, the district court denied
the plaintiffs motion for permanent injunctive relief. 62 The Federal Circuit then
patent. Id. Some argue NTP's concepts for "wireless email" are obvious and should not have been
granted a patent at all. See id.
53 See H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006); see also H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005). The following
was proposed to be added to the end of 35 U.S.C. § 283:
In determining equity, the court shall consider the fairness of the remedy in
light of all the facts and the relevant interest of the parties associated with the
invention. Unless an injunction is entered pursuant to a nonappealable judgment
of infringement, a court shall stay the injunction pending an appeal upon an
affirmative showing that the stay would not result in irreparable harm to the
owner of the patent and that the balance of hardships from the stay does not favor
the owner of the patent.
H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006); see
aso
H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
5 H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006) (the language in the previous version of H.R. 2795, 109th
Cong. (2005) is the same as H.R. 5096).
55 H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006).
56 MUELLER, supra note 2, at 384.
57 S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
5SeBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). This case is important because it
is the first case in which the Supreme Court has made a decision based on injunctive relief with
respect to a patent infringement case. Id. at 1838. Prior to this case, the Federal Circuit was the
controlling authority on this subject. Id. Much of the business and technology community was
interested in the resolution of this case because of the magnitude of the final decision. See id.
59 Id. at 1839.
6o Id. at 1841.
61 Id. at 1839.
62 Id. The Court further stated that although the District Court mentioned the traditional
four-factor test, the court appeared to adopt expansive principles with respect to injunctive relief
and stated that it could not issue such relief "in a broad swath of cases." Id. at 1840. The District
Court stated and concluded that a "plaintiffs willingness to license its patents" and "its lack of
commercial activity in practicing the patents" would be sufficient to establish that the patent holder
would not suffer irreparable harm if an injunction did not issue. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay,
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reversed and applied the "general rule that courts will issue permanent injunction
against patent infringement absent exigent circumstances."63 Finally, the Supreme
Court remanded the case back to the jury for further findings and concluded "neither
court below correctly applied the traditional four-factor framework that governs the
64
award of injunctive relief."
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in eBay, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice
Souter, and Justice Breyer, alluded to Patent Trolls, although it did not explicitly
state the term "Patent Trolls." 65 In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy stated
that companies use injunctions as a "bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to
66
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent."
The Supreme Court ruling in eBay and the proposed Patent Reform Act
additions to 35 U.S.C § 283, will create a different landscape with respect to patent
67
infringement disputes that categorically have been followed with an injunction.
Large technology companies, patent holding companies, Patent Trolls, small
technology companies, as well as the courts, will have to change the way they

Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003), rev'd, 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated
andremanded, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
6 MereExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded,
126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). In reversing the district court, the court of appeals departed in the opposite
direction from the four-factor test. Id. The court articulated a "general rule", unique to patent
disputes, "that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been
adjudged." Id. at 1338. The court further indicated that injunctions should be denied only in the
"unusual" case, under "exceptional circumstances" and "in rare instances ... to protect the public
interest." Id. at 1338-39.
6 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1841. Following this finding, the Supreme Court held that they could
take no position regarding the permanent injunctive relief. Id. The Court did finally state that the
"decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the
district courts." Id. They also held that this discretion should be exercised consistently with
traditional principles of equity. Id. These should occur in patent disputes no less than in other
cases governed by such standards. Id.
65 Id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., Stevens, J., Souter, J., Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy
further stated that in cases now arising, trial courts should bear in mind that in many instances the
nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function of the patent holder present
considerations quite unlike earlier cases. Id. An industry has developed in which firms use patents
not as a basis for producing and selling goods, but instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 3, pp 38-39 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/
innovationrpt.pdf.
66 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., Stevens, J., Souter, J., Breyer, J., concurring). When
the patented invention is a small component of the product the companies are producing and the
threat of an injunction is employed for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may be
sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction would not serve the public interest.
Id. In addition, injunctive relief may have different consequences for the growing number of
business method patents, which were not of much economic and legal significance in earlier times.
Id. The potential vagueness and validity of some of these patents may affect the balance of equities
under the four-factor test. Id. The equitable discretion over injunctions, as stated by The Patent
Act, will allow courts to adapt to the rapid technological and legal developments in the patent
system. Id.
67 Patent Trolls: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Lamar Smith,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary).
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approach patent protection and patent infringement disputes.

It is uncertain how

this will affect innovation and technology advances in the future.

II.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN EBAYALONG WITH THE PREVIOUSLY

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE PATENT REFORM ACT FOR INJUNCTIONS
COULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON BUSINESS AND INNOVATION
69
The decision in eBa/A8 and the previous Patent Reform Act recommendations
will potentially make it more difficult for a patent holder to receive a permanent
injunction in an infringement case. There are mainly two sides to the debate, the
large technology companies versus the small inventors and patent holding companies
(which include Patent Trolls). On one side, the large technology companies favor the
decision in eBay and are against the Federal Circuit's "general rule." On the other
side, the small inventors and patent holding companies are against the decision in
eBay and favor the Federal Circuit's "general rule." The following analysis centers
70
around four key ideas.
First, both sides have compelling arguments with respect to the presumption of
equitable principles required for an injunction. Second, both sides feel innovation
will be negatively affected by the other's position. Third, the small inventors and
patent holding companies feel Congressional action is required to change the
standard of issuing injunctive relief because of historical court precedent. 71 Last, the
large technology firms feel the issuing of injunctions according to the Federal
Circuit's "general rule" would continue to promote patent abuses causing significant
costs to both industry and society. 72

(8 eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837.
69 H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006).
70 Brief of Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at **4, nBa, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130), 2006 U.S.S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 341.
Universities have a fifth separate idea with regards to the analysis of the "general rule". Id. at
**16-17. If the injunctive relief power is lessened, university researchers would find it harder to
license their innovations. Td. The transfer of university technology to the public is required. Id.
Without the power of an injunction, a larger company could dominate the market with an infringing
product or process. Id. This impact could have a substantially negative effect on innovation and the
public. Td. It is also important to note many colleges and universities earn considerable royalties
from their intellectual property. Brief of the American Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at **17-18, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 342.
Harvard University reported $23.7 million in royalty fees in 2004. Id. at **18, n9 (citing HARVARD
UNIVERSITY, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON
PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS FISCAL YEAR 2004 5 (2005)). The University of Michigan reported
royalty earnings of $16.7 million. Td. at **18, n9 (citing UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN TECH TRANSFER,
2005 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2005)). If a university's ability to license their technologies is diminished,
their incentive to conduct research and further innovation is diminished and the public will suffer
the resultant harm. Id.
71See Brief of the American Bar Ass'n, supra note 70, at *8-10.
72 See, e.g., Brief of Time Warner, Inc. et al., supra note 7, at **14-21; JAFFE & LERNER, supra
note 1, at 113-14 (noting that one patent injunction cost Kodak $200 million in losses and 4,500 lost
jobs).
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A. Courts Should Follow the PrinciplesofEquity for the Issuance of
Injunctive Rehef in a PatentInfringement Case
There is no disagreement from either side that the courts should follow the
73
principles of equity to grant an injunction in a patent infringement action.
However, the proposed legislation and eBay could still greatly affect how the courts
analyze the principles of equity with respect to patent infringement and injunctions
in the future. When courts review the grant or denial of an injunction, four equitable
factors are evaluated: (1) whether the plaintiff would face irreparable harm or
injury, (2) whether the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law, (3) whether granting
of the injunction is in the public interest, and (4) whether the balance of those
74
hardships tips in the plaintiffs favor.
Those favoring the "general rule" assert that it adequately addresses the
principles of equity. They feel the "general rule" appropriately presumes each of the
traditional principles as valid when there is a finding of infringement. 75 However,
those against the Federal Circuit's "general rule" feel the four equitable factors
should be reviewed with the specific facts and circumstances for all patent
76
infringement cases with injunctions.

73

See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006).

See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982); Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987).
75 See Brief for General Electric Co. et al. as Amici Curiae Suggesting Affirmance at **25-40,
eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 331 (arguing in favor of
maintaining the "general rule" because of the historical protection of patents by injunctions, the
proper application of the principles of equity, and the lack of specific congressional action with
regard to injunctions); see also Brief of the American Bar Ass'n, supra note 70, at **11-13 (arguing
in favor of maintaining the "general rule" because of historical court precedent and irrebuttable
presumptions of the equitable principles in a patent infringement case); Brief of American
Intellectual Property Law Ass'n and Federal Circuit Bar Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither
Party at **14-32, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 90 (arguing that
the "general rule" appropriately recognizes three of the traditional injunction factors-irreparable
harm, inadequate remedy at law and the public interest-and these three are normally in favor of
the patent holder because of the exclusive right given by patents).
7 See Brief of Business Software Alliance et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
**37-52, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 144. The equitable
71

factors do not disfavor injunction in patent infringement cases. Id. at **38. The opposite is true,
injunctions will almost always be appropriate in the typical case of patent infringement where a
patentee practicing the invention sues a competitor in the same market and selling products that
infringe the patent. Id. However, there are some cases that will not follow this situation and it is
with these cases in which it is most important to apply all of the equitable principles. Td.; see also
Brief of 52 Intellectual Prop. Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4-5, eBay, 126 S.
Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 169 (arguing that the federal circuit has
abandoned the role of equity against the statutory language and that the application of the
equitable factors is important to avoid abuse of the patent system); Brief of Securities Industry et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at **8-10, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130), 2006 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 160 (arguing that the "equitable principles should govern injunctive relief' and
that the "general rule" actually distorts incentives to innovation in science and the arts).
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1. Does the PatentHolder Face IrreparableInjury and Have an Adequate Remedy at
Law if the Injunetion Is Not Granted?
The Federal Circuit, before eBay, had always found irreparable injury when a
valid patent had been infringed.7 7 Those that favor this "general rule" feel the
exclusive right granted to a patent holder exists for a limited time and this right
cannot be replaced. 78 The Federal Circuit had decided that infringement of a patent
was an unauthorized denial of that limited exclusive right and was thus an
irreparable harm not compensable by monetary damages.7 9 Accordingly, because of
the patent's very nature of exclusivity, the patent holder's loss of the finite
80
exclusivity period is irreparable and therefore there is no adequate remedy at law.
Those opposing the "general rule" assert irreparable injury does not necessarily
always follow the finding of infringement.81 "The key word in this consideration is
irreparable.
Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and
energy... are not enough."8 2 There is not enough support for the presumption of
irreparable injury and therefore in some situations there are other adequate
8 3
remedies at law available.
In situations where the patent holder grants non-exclusive licensing rights to
multiple buyers, irreparable injury would be difficult to prove. The patent holder's
willingness to grant these licenses to anyone willing to pay indicates the loss of the
"exclusive" right of the patent is redressable by money damages. Therefore, the
patentee's willingness to license freely coupled with its lack of commercial activity in
the patent demonstrates the patentee would not suffer irreparable harm and
therefore there is an adequate remedy at law available.

77 Smith Intern. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Federal
Circuit held that irreparable injury should be presumed when the party seeking the injunction
clearly establishes the validity and infringement of the patent. Id.; see also H.H. Robertson Co. v.
United Steel Deck Inc., 820 F.2d. 384, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (commenting on the rationale of the
presumption of irreparable injury and asserting that the opportunity to practice an invention during
the long course of patent litigation could be enough alone to tempt infringers).
78Brief for General Electric Co. et al., supra note 75, at **29.
79Smith Intern., 718 F.2d at 1581.
80 See id.at 1581-82.
SI Brief of Business Software Alliance et al., supra note 76, at ** 4 0 -43.
82 Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (quoting Va. Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Fed.
Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958); see also Brief of Business Software Alliance et
al., supra note 76, at **40 (citing 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.5(1) (1993) (defining an
irreparable injury as an injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law)).
83 Brief of Business Software Alliance et al., supra note 76, at **42; see also Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) (stating that a "presumption [of irreparable injury] is contrary to
traditional equitable principles"); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (stating
that without a clear congressional limitation included in the statutory language, there is no basis for
creating such a presumption).
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2. Is the Grantingof the Injunctionin the PublicInterest?
In Continental PaperBag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.,8 4 the Supreme Court

recognized a court of equity might be justified in not granting an injunction "in view
of the public interest."8 5 However, the Federal Circuit's use of the "general rule"
86
created a presumption in favor of the patent holder on this equitable factor.
Although the Federal Circuit made only one exception in favor of public health to
their "general rule,"87 the Federal Circuit had never stated that was the only
exception that could apply.88 With the eBay decision, as an example, the public
interest might weigh against injunctions that would deprive the public a useful
product or services and technologies.8 9 The RIM v. NTP case, involving the
BlackberryTM is a prime example of this.9 Another example is the situation in which
a patent injunction threatens third-party users, and society as a whole may be
harmed, because the injunctive relief will prohibit the use of interoperable systems
and services. 91 Therefore, the public interest factor is still an important equitable
principle, which the patent holder should prove and can be analyzed on a case-bycase basis.

3. Do the PatentHolder'sHarms or Hardshipsif the Injunction Is GrantedOutweigh
the PatentInfringer'sHarms or Hardshipif the Injunction Is Not Granted?
The equitable balance attempts to weigh those
holder's suffering without the injunction against
impose on the infringer. 92 Those in favor of the
imposed on the infringer rarely supports the denial

84

hardships incurred by the patent
the harm the injunction would
"general rule" feel the hardship
of injunctive relief because of the

210 U.S. 405 (1908).
430.

85 Id.at

86 See Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 785, 795-96 (E.D. Va. 1998).
87See, e.g., Datascope Corp. v. Kontron, Inc., 786 F.2d 398, 400 (Fed.Cir. 1986) (refusing to
grant an injunction in a medical-device case where practicing physicians preferred to use an
infringing product); Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16768, at *3-6 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (public interest required that an injunction not stop the supply of medical test kits that the
patentee itself was not marketing), afrd,849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
88 Brief of Business Software Alliance et al., supra note 76, at **50-52. The Department of
Justice filed a Statement of Interest in the RlMlitigation explaining that consumers, the public, and
the government had a substantial interest in the loss of the use of BlackberryTM technology. Id
(citing United States' Statement of Interest, NTP Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., No. 3:01 CV767
(E.D. Va.) at 2 (filed Nov. 8, 2005)).
89 Id.
90 Id. In the NTP case, the Department of Justice filed a Statement of Interest in the RIM

litigation explaining that consumers, the public, and the government had a substantial interest in
the loss of the use of Blackberry TM technology.9 0 Id. (citing United States' Statement of Interest,
NTP Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., No. 3:01 CV767 (E.D. Va.) at 2 (filed Nov. 8, 2005)).
91 Id. at **52.
92 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).
"Where plaintiff and defendant
present competing claims of injury, the traditional function of equity has been to arrive at a 'nice
adjustment and reconciliation' between competing claims .
I..."
Id. (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles,

321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)).
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right of exclusivity provided by a patent. 93 Protecting the patent exclusivity right
overwhelms any of the commercial harms caused to the patent infringer or wrongdoer.

94

Those against the "general rule" however, feel this balance of hardships should
consider the pertinent facts of the case and relevant factors. 95 In analyzing the facts
of the case with the relevant factors, it is possible in some cases that the harms
caused to the infringer outweigh the hardship to the patent owner. Therefore, the
courts should not impose a presumption in favor of one party in regard to this factor.

B.

The Broad Use or Non -Use ofInjunetive Relief Has a Detrimental
Effect on Innovation.

Both sides feel the decision to eliminate the Federal Circuit's "general rule" will
have an impact on innovation. Small inventors and patent holding companies feel
innovation will suffer greatly if their injunctive power is diminished by the
elimination of the "general rule." 96 Large technology companies feel that innovation
will suffer if courts would have continued to follow the Federal Circuit's "general
97
rule" for injunctive relief.
The small inventors, patent holding companies and biotechnology firms' main
argument is that their inventions and innovations contribute significantly to the
American economy.
However, without the threat of an injunction, the costly

9 Brief for General Electric Co. et al., supra note 75, at **29-36.
91Id. at ** 3 3 -34. "Protecting this exclusive right must be a paramount consideration in the
district court's equitable balancing." Id.
95 Brief of Business Software Alliance et al., supra note 76, at **43-50. Those factors include:
harm to the patentee if no injunction is issued, the patent owner's investment in the patent and the
circumstances of the acquisition, whether the patentee presented the claim to the PTO prior to the
infringing activity became publicly known, whether the infringing company made substantial
investments dependent on the patented technology before it learned of the alleged infringements,
and whether the injunction would require the defendant to redesign its product in a way that would
render it incompatible with their other products or services, causing products already used by

consumers to be negatively affected. Id. at **44.
96 See Brief of the United Inventors Ass'n and Technology Licensing Corp., supra note 8, at
**5-13 (arguing independent inventors will suffer without the threat of an injunction because of the
financial imbalance between the large companies and independent inventors); see also Brief of
Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at **9-21, eBay,
126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 347 (arguing that biotech innovation
would be hindered if there is a loss of injunctive relief when the patent holder does not use the
invention).
97 Brief of Business Software Alliance et al., supra note 76, at **14-22 (arguing that the
'general rule" deters innovation because of the complexity and overlapping of patented products and
their components); see also Brief of Securities Industry et al., supra note 76, at ** 2 8 -39 (arguing
that the "general rule" distorts incentives to advance science and technology because "[innovation
depends on patent protection that is both strong and flexible."); Brief of Nokia Corp. as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at **15-29, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130), 2006 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 163 (arguing that the "general rule" threatens to slow progress in technological fields
by "undermining interoperability standards that are vital to technological sophisticated industries");
Brief of Computer & Communications Industry Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
**26-30, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 173 (arguing that the
"Federal Circuit's rule impedes innovation by ignoring the changing nature of innovation").
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litigation required to protect their patents will greatly diminish the licensing value
and bargaining power of these groups. 98 For example, a member of the United
Inventors Association reported, "[w]hen I approached a large company with my
invention to offer it for licensing, their exact words were: 'if we decide to manufacture
this, just sue us ...

."'99

In this situation, the large company knew that litigation

was too costly for the independent inventor, so they never even took the offer to
license his technology seriously. 100
The biotechnology industry specifically argues that in their industry, the risks of
their products and innovation require a patent system that will adequately protect
their interests. 10 1 The primary asset of these biotechnology companies are their
patents. 102 Obviously protecting these patents is important to earning a payback for
the high-cost of research and development aimed at the high rewards of promoting
health, longevity and well-being. 103 Without an ability to place injunctions on
10 4
infringers as a general rule, the right to exclude will become meaningless.
Therefore, many of these biotechnology firms will not be able to attract the capital
necessary to fund the research and development required for new medicines and
treatments.105 The two examples below demonstrate the importance of investment in
the biotechnology industry:
(1) Nektar Therapeutics. The company's reliance on a single patent raised $1.2
106
billion in financing from outside investors.
(2) AlphaVax. AlphaVax patented a technology that is not anticipated to be
approved for use until 2011.107 The company must attract investors who will risk
millions of dollars on the chance this therapy will reach the marketplace.10 8 The
company, as well as the investors, must have confidence in their patent's ability to
provide a predictable right to exclude. 109
In contrast, large technology companies feel the use of the "general rule" was a
detriment to innovation. They feel patents are not limited to discrete technologies
where the market value of a patent can be tied to one or a few single patents. 110
98Brief of the United Inventors Ass'n and Technology Licensing Corp., supra note 8, at **9-13.
See also JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 1, at 4.

[V]aluable technologies have become snarled in a web of litigation and
licensing negotiations. And as young firms have found themselves unable to
commercialize their ideas, economic growth has suffered. Consumers therefore
have less access to new products-from lifesaving drugs to productivity-enhancing
software-than would be the case if innovative companies were not distracted
from innovation by litigation and fear of litigation.

Id.
99Brief of the United Inventors Ass'n and Technology Licensing Corp., supra note 8, at *11.
100 Id.

101 Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization, supranote 96, at ** 12.
102 Id.
103 Id. at *'13.
104

Id.

105 Id.

106 Id. at **1314. In 2006, the company received approval for their inhaled insulin product,
the first insulin not administered by injection. Id.
107 Id. at *'14.
108
109

Id.
Id.

110 Brief of Nokia Corp., supra note 97, at **15-29.
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Today, products are made of many components and processes, each patented
individually, which could be from many different companies, organizations, or
11 2
individuals."'1 Also, a marketable product is made of many interoperable patents.
Therefore, it is difficult for companies to proceed forward with innovative products
with the possibility of an automatic injunction shutting down their entire product
113
line because of one small component infringing on another's patent.

C Those in Favorof the "GeneralRule" Feel CourtPrecedentRequires
CongressionalAction to Change the StandardofIssuingInjunctive Relief
The Patent Law precedent has been consistent and predictable in resolving
conflicts between patent holders and patent infringers. Historically, the Federal
Circuit has followed the "general rule" after finding infringement.1 1 4 Therefore, to
change the rules "mid-stream" would not be fair or just to the current participants in
the market.
Those against the "general rule" argue that the use of injunctions should be
limited to a certain class of patent holder, those who are practicing their patents.
However, those in favor of keeping the "general rule" have counter-argued that
limiting injunctions to certain patent holders is an issue for Congress, and not the
courts.11 5 There should be no difference or limitation between those who are
116
practicing their patents and those who are not.
The goal of the previously proposed legislation was to more narrowly define
situations in which injunctive relief should be granted.11 7 In this previous 2006
proposal, Congress specifically added phrases from the traditional equitable
principles such as, "irreparable harm" and "balance of hardships" to section 283,
Injunction.118 Therefore, if this legislation were to be passed into law, those against
the "general rule" feel the courts should then follow the changes in legislation and
more narrowly define the granting of injunctions. Until that time, the courts should
continue following the historical precedent set for the past one hundred years until
eBay.

D. Those Against the "GeneralRule"Argue Injunctive Relief Granted
Using the "GeneralRule" Will Cause PatentAbuse While
CausingSignifieant Costs to Business and Society
An injunction is a powerful remedy. It can force a potential infringer to close
down a production line or stop marketing their main product, with potentially grave

111
112

Id. at **16.

Id.

113Id.at

**23, **25, **26.
W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc. 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir., 1988).
H5 Brief of the American Bar Ass'n, supra note 70, at **17-21.
116 Id. at **17-18.
117 MUELLER, supra note 2, at 384; H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006).
118H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006).
114

[6:671 2007]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

business results. 119 The threat of an injunction enables the patent holder to extract
licensing fees disproportionate to the value of the patent, while also imposing
120
significant additional social costs.
Patent infringement is relatively easy to prove, while patent invalidity is
difficult to prove, and patent litigation is expensive. Because of these reasons, the
patent infringer will most likely not participate in patent litigation. Therefore, the
threat of an automatic injunction causes the patent infringer to license the patent at
exorbitant fees. In most cases, these fees are passed on to society in the increased
costs of consumer products, forcing everyone to pay. 121
The "general rule" also caused significant costs to consumers and public
interests that are not covered in the Federal Circuit's narrow exception for
extraordinary and imminent harm to public health. 122 These costs could also include
the loss of access to medically needed procedures 123 or vital communications
equipment. 124

III. THE TRIANGLE OF CHANGE
The recent eBay decision mandated all lower courts with patent infringement
cases to use traditional equitable principles and the four-factor test when evaluating
& LERNER, supra note 1, at 113-14.
Brief of Time Warner, Inc. et. al., supra note 7, at **14-21, **33-36; see also FED. TRADE

119 JAFFE
120

COMM'N., To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND
POLICY 6 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. ("In some industries, such as
computer hardware and software, firms can require access to dozens, hundreds, or even thousands
of patents to produce just one commercial product.").
121 Brief of Time Warner, Inc., et. al., supra note 7, at **13-21. Companies must now review
numerous patents to ensure that the many components they utilize to make their products are not
infringing. Id. at *'15. It can be expensive to incorporate a new non-infringing minor element into
a larger manufactured process. Id. at **17. Increased costs can come from a number of different
scenarios: 1) removal of a component from a process control system could shut down an entire
manufacturing process, 2) substitution of a new component can create expensive and time
consuming testing and integration into the process system, 3) substitution of a new software
subroutine as software programs have intricate and unexpected interactions with other programs
and systems, 4) the changing of a minor component will cause a delay that is costly because of the
installation time or debugging of software and this delay can cost the company significant sales. Id.
at **17-19.
122 Brief of Time Warner, Inc., et. al., supra note 7, at **33-36.
123 Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Masimo Corp., No. 00-6506, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28518 (C.D. Cal.
July 12, 2004) (demonstrating the Federal Circuit's narrow exception to the public policy factor). In
this case, the trial judge denied Masimo's request for injunction because the doctors testified that an
injunction "would likely compromise patient safety by forcing health professionals to switch back
and forth between types of oximeters." Id. at *103. In an unreported opinion, the Federal Circuit
reversed the trial judge's denial of the injunction. Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Masimo Corp., 147 F. App'x
158, 175-78 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Federal Circuit stated that "it is contrary to the laws of property
to deny a patentee the right to exclude others from use of his property." Id. at 178.
124 Brief of Time Warner, Inc., et. al., supra note 7, at **35. The public health exception does
not take into account any other widespread harms that an automatic injunction could cause to the
public. Id. With the BlackBerry case, 3.65 million BlackBerry TM users would have been deprived
service if an injunction were enforced. Id. This shows that an automatic injunction may be allowed
even though it could potentially disrupt vast and established communication networks on which
much of the public depends. Id.

[6:671 2007]

Patent Reform, Injunctions, and Equitable Principles

the grant of injunctive relief to a patentee. 125 This decision essentially resulted in
removing the Federal Circuit's long-standing "general rule" of granting an injunction
to a patent holder when the patent has been infringed. 126 Concurrently, Congress
has been debating reform to the Patent Act with regards to this same subject. The
previously proposed legislation's goal is to define more narrowly situations in which
the courts can grant injunctive relief. 127 In this legislation, the proposal specifically
adds phrases from the equitable principles such as "irreparable harm" and "balance
128
of hardships."
One of the main policies of the patent system is to reward innovation through
the use of protection in the form of patents. 129 The goal of this proposal is to protect
legitimate inventors and patent holders, large or small, from big technology firms'
abuse of patented technology while also protecting those same big technology firms
against the Patent Trolls. The two-fold proposal presented meets both needs while
furthering innovation, and thus, the goals of the patent system.
Courts should follow the Supreme Court's finding in eBay and the four-factor
test as the rule for granting injunctions in a patent infringement case. However,
when requesting an injunction, the patent holder should have a rebuttable
presumption on two of the factors. My proposal states in order to eliminate the
granting of an injunction, the patent infringer or the wrong-doer must (1) prove the
patent holder will not suffer an irreparable harm from the infringement and (2) the
patent holder does have an adequate remedy at law other than the granting of an
injunction. Additionally, this comment proposes Congress codify the patent reform
bill as previously proposed in H.R. 5096, specifically the modification to the
injunctive relief section.

A. When GrantingInjunctions, the Courts Should Continue to Use the Four-Factor
Test from eflay of (1)IrreparableHarm, (2) Inadequate Remedy at Law,
(3)Balance ofHardships,and (4)Pubhlic Interest
When examining each of the four factors,13 0 the courts should use a rebuttable
presumption of validity for the factors of irreparable harm and inadequate remedy at
125 eBay Inc. v. MereExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006). Compare z4 Technologies
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 439, 444 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (restating the four-factor test
from eBay and finding the plaintiff did not meet the factor of irreparable harm and therefore an
injunction was not granted), with Tivo, Inc. v. Echostar Commc'n Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669
(E.D. Tex. 2006) (restating the four-factor test from eBay and finding that the plaintiff did meet all
factors of the test, therefore an injunction was granted).
126 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1841; see also Paice, L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04CV211DF,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600 at *3 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (stating that the district court's "general" rule
should no longer be used, "equitable relief is not mandatory in patent cases"); Voda v. Cordis Corp.,
No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 U.S Dist. LEXIS 63623 at *17 (W.D. Okla. 2006) (stating "permanent

injunctions in patent cases should not automatically follow a finding of infringement").
127 MUELLER,
128 H.R. 5096,
12 9

supra note 2, at 384.

109th Cong. (2006).
JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 1, at 7-9.
130 eBqy, 126 S. Ct. at 1838; see also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13
(1982) (stating that according to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a
permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief).
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law in order to maintain innovation and inventiveness. If a presumption of validity
in these two factors is not present, the small inventors will have limited bargaining
power compared to large technology corporations. These large technology companies
will be able to infringe and use their economic power without fear of injunctive relief
to overpower the small inventors, thus stunting innovation and invention. Using a
presumption of validity for these two factors shifts the burden to the defendant, the
wrong-doer, and infringer, to prove the presumption is not valid.

1. The Accused InfringerMust Demonstrate the PatentHolder Has Not Suffered an
IrreparableInjury
Many courts find it difficult to define "irreparable injury." The Federal Circuit
recently defined irreparable injury as an injury that cannot be remedied with money
131
or when the district court cannot issue a remedy following the case circumstances.,
In the past, the Federal Circuit has used a number of different factors to determine
whether irreparable harm exists. 13 2 One of these factors is: Will the infringement
erode the patent holder's position in the market?133 Another example of one of the
considerations is: Will plaintiff lose substantial profits from defendant's continuing
infringement? 134

11 Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d 1234, 1250 (10th Cir. 2001).

Jacobson v. Cox Paving Co., Civ. No. 89-1786 PHX PGR, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17787 at
*44-45 (D. Ariz. 1991), affd, 949 F.2d 404 (1991). The Federal Circuit's factors to determine if
132

irreparable harm exists:
1. Will the defendant's continuing infringement injure any collateral benefit
provided by the patent other than a right to receive money damages?
2. Will the defendant's continuing infringement interfere with the plaintiffs
ability to control the use and licensing of the patented technology?
3. Will the defendant's continuing infringement erode the plaintiffs position
in the market?
4. Will the defendant's continuing infringement encourage others to
infringe?
5. Will issuance of an injunction deter other existing or potential infringers
and influence them to back off?
6. Does defendant's continuing infringement threaten survival of the
plaintiffs business?
7. Are plaintiff and defendant direct competitors trying to influence the
same group of customers?
8. Has plaintiff spent a large sum of money on market development?
9. Does plaintiff stand to lose a large part of its market share if infringement
is not enjoined?
10. Will defendant's continued infringement have a substantial deleterious
impact on plaintiffs market share and pricing structure?
11. Will plaintiff lose substantial profits from defendant's continuing
infringement?
12. Has the defendant destroyed the value of the plaintiffs patent?
13. Will the plaintiffs patent expire in less than two years?
14. Is the defendant judgment proof?
Id. at *44-45 (citations omitted).
133

Jacobson, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17787 at *45.

134

Id.
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Prior to the finding in the eBay case, the Federal Circuit found irreparable
injury should be presumed when the patent holder seeking the injunction establishes
the validity and infringement of the patent. 135 This should continue to be the case as
the courts go forward. Because of the very nature of the exclusivity of patents, the
patent holder should be granted a presumption of irreparable harm even in light of
the recent eBay decision. If irreparable harm is not presumed, the patent holder
would be required to prove that irreparable harm exists by proving any number of
the aforementioned considerations. This may be difficult and more importantly,
expensive, especially for the small company inventor or the single inventor versus a
large technology company who is not as concerned with the costs of litigation.
However, this presumption of irreparable harm does not preclude the patent
infringer from proving irreparable harm does not exist. The Federal Circuit has
stated a "patentee's entitlement to a presumption of irreparable harm would not in
itself and in every case be dispositive of the irreparable harm question." 136 This
presumption of irreparable harm is of course rebuttable by the accused infringer. 137
Maintaining the current presumption of irreparable harm for the patent holder
helps protect the large corporations from wielding their enormous legal and economic
power over the smaller inventors. The rebuttal of the presumption of irreparable
harm will ensure that Patent Trolls will not be able to maintain the bargaining
power they currently possess. The accused infringer in a Patent Troll situation
should be able to easily show the patentee will not suffer irreparable harm. In most
Patent Troll cases, the Patent Troll attempts to license the product to multiple
companies and does not practice the patent. Therefore, the accused patent infringer
will be able to rebut the presumption of irreparable harm to the Patent Troll by
showing that there is no irreparable harm because of the Patent Troll's actions.

2. The Aecused InfringerMust Demonstratean Adequate Remedy Other Than an
Injunction Exists for the PatentHolder
The courts have recognized the irreparable harm requirement and the adequate
remedy at law are similar. 138 A patent holder suffers no irreparable harm if he can
obtain full compensation through the legal remedy of monetary damages. 139
One way to demonstrate that an adequate remedy at law exists is through the
previous dealings between the patentee and patent infringer. Patent Trolls are
known to send out hundreds of cease and desist letters to infringing companies with

135 Smith Intern., Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also
H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck Inc., 820 F.2d. 384, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
136 Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc., 906 F.2d 679, 681 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
137 HH..
Robertson, 820 F.2d at 390; see also Jack Guttman, Inc. v. Kopykake Enters. Inc.,
302 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding "the presumption is rebuttable, and [an accused
infringer] must be afforded the opportunity to rebut it ... ").
138 CHISUM, supra note 12, at § 20.04 (1)(e) (2006).

139 Id.;

see also 5

J.

THOMAS

MCCARTHY,

MCCARTHY

ON TRADEMARKS

AND

UNFAIR

COMPETITION § 30:46 (4th ed. 2006) (stating the "irreparable injury' requirement is merely a
specific application of the general doctrine that equitable relief cannot be granted unless plaintiff
shows that the remedy at law is inadequate").
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the option of a license agreement and monetary payment. 140 In these situations, it is
obvious the Patent Troll has an adequate remedy of money damages because of his
previous negotiations and communications. The Patent Trolls routinely request
licensing arrangements in cease and desist letters to accused infringers. Therefore,
money damages are an adequate remedy at law and no injunction is appropriate.

3. The PatentHolderMust Demonstrate the Balance of Hardships Weighs in His
FavorShould the Injunetion Be Granted
For the balance of hardships equitable principle of the four-factor test, it is
important to perform the analysis with a focus on the particular facts and
circumstances of the case. 14 1 As the Supreme Court stated, all four factors must be
analyzed in order to determine whether injunctive relief can be granted. 142
The courts should maintain the same analysis as in the past. In the past, courts
have granted injunctive relief to the patent holders with regard to the balance of
hardships, unless the balance is decidedly in favor of the patent infringer. 143 These
cases may occur when (1) the patent infringer uses a patented product that does not
compete with the patent holder's product in manufacturing and sales, 144 (2) the
patent infringer is a small company with little impact on the market of the patent
holder, 145 or (3) the injunction would shut-down a substantial market, 146 such as the
47
RIMcase involving the BlackberryTM. 1

110 Overstock.com, Inc. v. Furnace Brook, L.L.C., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1218 (D. Utah 2005)
(stating that Furnace Brook has issued a number of cease and desist letters to potential patent
infringers); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1838 (2006) (stating that
MercExchange settled with numerous companies by sending licensee letters to potential infringers).
141 H.H Robertson, 820 F.2d at 390 (stating "[e]ven when irreparable injury is presumed and
not rebutted, it is still necessary to consider the balance of hardships.").
142

eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842.

143 CHISUM, supranote 12, at.§ 20.04 (1)((i) (2006).

144 Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co. v.Bussing, 10 F. Cas. 348, 349 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.1875).
'15 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Genrad, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1141, 1153-54 (D. Mass. 1995); see also
Wang Labs. Inc. v. The Chip Merchant Inc., Civ. No. 93-893, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20012 at *18-19
(S.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that if a patent infringer is a small sole proprietorship that may be forced
into bankruptcy if an injunction is granted shows a balance of hardships because the patent
infringer may not be able to pay a monetary judgment).
146Tyco Indus., Inc. v. Tiny Love, Ltd., 914 F. Supp. 1068, 1083 (D.N.J. 1996); see also Am.
Cyanamid Co. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 833 F. Supp. 92, 124, 132-33 (D. Conn. 1993) (finding that
there was greater hardship to the accused infringer because the patentee was a large, diversified
company and if an injunction was granted against the distribution of the accused product, it would
preclude the accused infringer from selling the entire line of products to hospitals; the potential for
job losses at the accused infringer was greater than the potential for job losses at the patentee).
147 CHISUM, supra note 12, at § 20.04 (1)(f)(i) (2006). Compare z4 Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 442-43 (E.D. Tx., 2006) (finding that the balance of hardships for the
patent infringer, Microsoft, of the resources, time, and expenses required to redesign the Windows
and Office software significantly outweigh the hardships argued by z4 of the use of its intellectual
property), with Tivo, Inc. v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669 (E.D. Tex., 2006)
(finding that the hardship weighs in favor of granting a permanent injunction in that the patentee is
continually losing business as the infringing company is allowed to produce and sell their product
which directly compete with the patentee).
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4 The PatentHolderMust Demonstrate the PublicInterest Would Be DisservedIf
an Injunction Is Not Granted.
Donald Chisum states only rarely will the public interest be seriously affected by
the grant or denial of an injunction in a patent infringement case. 148 The interests of
the public are both in the protection of patents and the economic growth of
industries. In the past, courts have placed a high public interest value on the
maintenance and enforcement of a valid patent. 149 This high public interest in
protecting valid patents should be maintained. 150 However, there are situations
where the public interest of maintaining a valid patent is outweighed by other public
interests. 151 These situations should be examined on a case-by-case basis with the
merits of the case and surrounding circumstances.

B. CongressShould Codify the PreviouslyProposedChanges to the Injunction
Section of the PatentReform Bill.
In the House and Senate's most recent proposal of patent reform
recommendations, they do not make a recommendation to change the injunction
section, section 283.152 These recent proposals were introduced after eBayin August
2006. It would be a mistake not to include the proposed changes to the injunction
section. Congress must ensure this section is changed similarly to the earlier
proposed House Bills. 1 5 3 Each of the earlier proposed House Bills includes the terms
"irreparable harm" and "balance of hardships."

154

By including these terms, it is

clear that Congress supports the eBay Supreme Court decision. Without including
these terms, it leaves a question in the minds of subsequent courts as to whether a

148 CHISUM, supra note 12, at § 20.04(1)(f)(ii) (2006); see also Alliance Research Corp. v.
Telular Corp., 859 F. Supp. 400, 406 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (stating "[t]he public has an interest both in
protecting patent rights and ensuring that markets are competitive").
149 Soo Jacobson v. Cox Paving Co., Civ. No. 89-1786 PHX PGR, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17787
at *60-61 (D. Ariz. 1991), affd, 949 F.2d 404 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating public policy favors the
protection of the rights of patentees' valid patents and that the American public is not served by
favoring short-term effects of competition in the marketplace over the long-term effects of decreased
incentives for innovation under the patent laws); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs, 630 F.2d
120, 138 (3d. Cir. 1980) (stating "Congress has determined that it is better for the nation in the longrun to afford the inventors of novel, useful, and non-obvious products short-term monopolies on such
products than it is to permit free competition in such goods").
150 Tivo, Inc. v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 670 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (finding
that the public interest of maintaining a strong patent system is best served by enforcing the patent
and granting an injunction to the patentee against the accused infringer).
151 z4 Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 443-44 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(finding that the public interest due to the enormous and undisputed reliance on Microsoft Windows
and Office outweighs the public interest of protecting the patent system in this case and therefore
not granting the injunction to the patentee).
152 S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
153 H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006) (adding terms such as "irreparable injury" and "balancing of
hardships" to the current section 283).
154 H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006) (each of these bills add to the current section 283 wording
by adding terms such as "irreparable injury" and "balancing of hardships").
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"general rule" of injunctive relief should be granted as previously recognized by the
federal courts.
The proponents for the "general rule" feel the courts should continue to use the
"general rule" as long as there is no Congressional intervention. Their stance is the
decision in eBay should not overturn the historical precedent of the past one hundred
years of using the general rule. This is why it is even more important Congress
includes the revisions as stated by the previous House Bills in the injunction section
of the patent reform bills.

IV. CONCLUSION
It is evident the four-factor test as pronounced in eBay must be followed as
patent litigation moves forward. However, the district courts and the Federal Circuit
should start to adopt rebuttable presumptions on the factors of irreparable harm and
adequate remedy at law. This will help to ensure the patent holder retains the most
power, while requiring the patent infringer to demonstrate these factors are not
present in order to defeat the grant of an injunction.
It is also important Congress continues to move forward with the Patent Reform
Act and include the changes to Section 283, Injunction to codify the language of the
Supreme Court in eBay, such as "irreparable injury" and a "balance of hardships."
Adoption by Congress of these terms will continue to foster innovation and invention,
especially with respect to injunctive relief in infringement cases.
These two actions will help to ensure that one of the main policies of the patent
system, to reward innovation through the use of protection in the form of patents is
maintained. This proposal protects legitimate inventors and patent holders, large or
small, from big technology firms' abuse of patented technology while also protecting
those same big technology firms against the Patent Trolls. The two-fold proposal
presented meets both needs while furthering innovation, and thus, the goals of the
patent system.

